Identifying Bid Leakage In Procurement Auctions: Machine Learning
  Approach by Ivanov, Dmitry I. & Nesterov, Alexander S.
IDENTIFYING BID LEAKAGE IN PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS:
MACHINE LEARNING APPROACH
DMITRY I. IVANOV AND ALEXANDER S. NESTEROV
Abstract. We propose a novel machine-learning-based approach to detect bid leakage in
first-price sealed-bid auctions. We extract and analyze the data on more than 1.4 million
Russian procurement auctions between 2014 and 2018. As bid leakage in each particular
auction is tacit, the direct classification is impossible. Instead, we reduce the problem of bid
leakage detection to Positive-Unlabeled Classification. The key idea is to regard the losing
participants as fair and the winners as possibly corrupted. This allows us to estimate the
prior probability of bid leakage in the sample, as well as the posterior probability of bid
leakage for each specific auction. We find that at least 16% of auctions are exposed to bid
leakage. Bid leakage is more likely in auctions with a higher reserve price, lower number of
bidders and lower price fall, and where the winning bid is received in the last hour before
the deadline.
Keywords: corruption, bid leakage, procurement auctions, positive-unlabeled learning
JEL Classification: C38, C57, D82, H57
1. Introduction
In each country public procurement is an important and complex sector of the economy.
In 2017 in Russia, the annual total volume of public procurement was 36.5 trillion rubles,
which amounts to around a third of the annual GDP. A majority of contracts in Russian
procurement are awarded through auctions, which in theory allocates the contract to the most
efficient firm at the lowest possible price. In practice, however, certain tacit manipulations
can corrupt the outcome both in terms of efficiency of allocation and the contract price.
In this paper we study “requests for quotations“ – small and frequent online first price
sealed-bid procurement auctions. These auctions can suffer from bid leakage – the corrup-
tion scheme where procurer illegally provides his favored participant with the information
about the bids of the other participants. Our goal is to estimate how widespread bid leakage
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BID LEAKAGE IN PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS 2
is in general and to determine how likely it is that each particular auction has been affected
by bid leakage.
We analyze the dataset containing more than 1.4 mln Russian requests for quotations.
The dataset covers all the auctions that took place from January 2014 to March 2018 and is
extracted from the online database.1
Figure 1. Example of typical request for quotations with leaked bids
Notes: The auction lasts more than 7 days. The auction is suspicious for bid leakage as the winner bids
near the deadline, after every other bid, and only slightly below the runner-up.
Our work is inspired by Andreyanov et al. (2016) who observed the patterns that are likely
to reflect rational behavior of the favoured participant that received leaked bids (see Figure
1): these participants are
(1) bidding last,
(2) bidding close to the deadline, and
(3) winning by a small margin.
The intuition behind these three patterns in auctions with bid leakage is straightforward.
First, the only way for the unfair participant to know every other bid and ensure her win
is to bid the last, hence pattern (1). Similarly, she delays bidding as much as possible to
lower the risks of not being the last, hence pattern (2). As she aims for the highest profit,
she slightly undercuts the current best bid, hence pattern (3).
We use these three patterns to determine whether a particular auction has been corrupted
by bid leakage. To do that we develop a two-stage identification strategy.
In the first stage we build a classifier that distinguishes the winners from the runner-ups
by using features associated with patterns (1), (2) and (3). For a given auction winner, the
higher is the predicted probability of winning, the more suspicious the auction is.
In a world without bid leakage, and assuming that these features are not related to the
actual bid, such classifier would fail and if it does not then it has to be due to bid leakage. In
practice however, the classifier might still be able to predict the winners well even in auctions
without bid leakage, which leads to biased estimates. To correct our estimates we construct
a synthetic placebo dataset of fair auctions and estimate the sign and the size of the bias.
1ftp://ftp.zakupki.gov.ru/
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In the second stage we use the classifier’s predictions and performance to estimate the prior
probability that a random auction in the dataset is corrupted, and the posterior probability
that a specific auction is corrupted – conditional on the probability of winning that the
classifier has assigned to its winner.
We estimate the prior probability of bid leakage as 16%. We also find that the bid leakage
is more likely in auctions with a higher reserve price lower number of bidders and lower price
fall, and where the winning bid is received in the last hour before the deadline.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the background on
requests for quotations and the relevant literature and sketch our identification strategy. In
Section 3 we describe the dataset. In Section 4 we present the two stages of our bid leakage
estimation: the classifier and the estimates for prior and posterior probability of bid leakage.
In Section 5 we present the results of estimation, provide few robustness checks and economic
implications. Section 6 concludes.
2. Problem setup and identification strategy
2.1. Requests for quotations and background on bid leakage detection. In Russia
requests for quotations are used for distributing small contracts such as roof repair for a
factory or products delivery to a school kitchen. Before each auction starts, the procurer
makes an announcement with the relevant information about the contract and the auction.
The announcement includes reserve price – the maximal price the contract can be assigned
for, the reserve price is bounded by 500000 rubles (approximately $8000). The auction lasts
at least one week. During this period potential participants can submit their bids. Each
participant can submit only one bid, the bids are sealed. After the auction ends, all bids
are revealed and the smallest bid wins, the final price equals the winning bid (first-price
auction).
Throughout the paper we only study successful bid leakage, that is when the honest
winning bid has been leaked to and undercut by a favored bidder.
The literature on manipulations in auctions is prolific but mostly concerned with collusion
schemes such as bid rigging Porter and Zona (1993) and bid rotation Aoyagi (2003); a rather
recent review of the literature on collusion detection is available in Harrington (2005).
Crucial to our research question is the timing of bids, and the Russian procurement data
is unique to contain this information. Previously, timing of bids has been studied in repeated
Internet auctions such as eBay, where each bidder has a set of moments in time where he
can submit a bid Song (2004). But, to the best of our knowledge, timing of bids has not
been used before to detect corruption (except for Andreyanov et al. (2016) that we discuss
below).
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Other papers studying bid leakage or other forms of corruption using Russian data do so
on a local scale of specific market or during specific period of time Yakovlev et al. (2016);
Mironov and Zhuravskaya (2016); Balsevich and Podkolzina (2014). The empirical literature
on auctions is rich (see, e.g., the seminal works Athey and Haile (2007) and Krasnokut-
skaya and Seim (2011)), yet there are only few studies that use supervised machine learning
(classification) in auction corruption detection. Typically they utilize small datasets of few
hundreds of labeled auctions Ferwerda et al. (2017); Huber et al. (2018).
2.2. Identification strategy and placebo. The only closely related papers to ours are
Andreyanov et al. (2016) and its recent version Korovkin et al. (2018): we study the same
object using the same data. However, our identification and estimation strategy is differ-
ent in three crucial ways: we use weaker assumptions, more advanced methods and larger
set of characteristics (i.e., features), which additionally enables us to determine posterior
probability of bid leakage for each specific auction.
The identification in Andreyanov et al. (2016); Korovkin et al. (2018) relies on a crucial
assumption that, in the auctions without bid leakage, bids and timing of the bids are inde-
pendent. If independence holds, then the higher likelihood of the last bids to win compared
to earlier bids is attributed exclusively to bid leakage.
The independence assumption might fail for a number of reasons. The longer time it takes
a risk-averse bidder to study the case, the lower will his bid be. For example, in our data
we observe that 1,2% of participants behave like “snipers”: they bid during the first day of
the auction and bid slightly below the reserve price (up to 5%).
Another reason comes from the honest bidders’ attempts to resist bid leakage. On the one
hand, the later the bid is submitted, the lower is the chance that it is going to be leaked
and undercut by a corrupted bidder. On the other hand, submitting closer to the deadline
requires attention and possibly costly logistics.2 As a result, a bidder with a higher valuation
(i.e., lower execution costs) submits a lower bid and, simultaneously, is ready to delay the
submission more relative to a bidders with a lower valuation. Because bidding and timing
are confounded through valuation, the independence assumption does not hold. A later bid
has a higher chance of winning not only due to presence of bid leakage, but due to mere
expectation of bid leakage. We present this argument formally in the Subsection 2.3.
We do not rely on independence assumption. Instead, we correct our estimates using a
synthetic placebo dataset of fair auctions. We remove the first-ranked bidders (the true
winners) from all the auctions and recalculate the features accordingly. This way, we obtain
a new dataset where the second places are treated as the winners and the third places –
as the runner-ups (Figure 2). We estimate the bias in these synthetic auctions and assume
2Anecdotal evidence suggests that some bidders did not rely on post or courier services and delivered their
bids personally to make sure to submit just before the deadline.
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that this bias is equal to the bias in fair auctions in the original dataset. We verify this
assumption and compare it to independence in Section 4.3.
Figure 2. Placebo auction example, transformed from the auction at Figure 1
Notes: The placebo auction is generated by removing the winning bid from the auction. In this
hypothetical auction, bid 1 belongs to the winner, bid 2 – to the runner-up. The auction is no longer
suspicious for bid leakage.
Second, in contrast to reduced-form and structural statistical models we use machine
learning techniques. This allows us to consider all the evidence on bid leakage patterns
at once and without imposing restrictions on their interconnection. When we only include
subset of the relevant features as it is done in Korovkin et al. (2018), we get significantly less
accurate predictions.
Finally, we descend from the population level and develop a method able to assign the
posterior probability of the bid leakage presence to every auction in the dataset. Our method
provides more precise and specific estimates of bid leakage and can be used for automatic
ex-post bid leakage detection, which can be useful for regulation and auditing authorities.
2.3. Game-theoretic model of bid leakage. In this Section we formalize the intuition
behind our identification strategy using a simple game-theoretic model.
First consider the world without bid leakage. An auctioneer is selling a procurement
contract with reserve price normalized to 1, and the lowest possible cost of executing the
contract is normalized to zero. Each bidder is risk-neutral and is drawing his execution costs
e from a uniform distribution on [0, 1], or, equivalently, each bidder has an iid valuation
v = 1 − e drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]; the cumulative density function is
F (v) = v.
Let the expected number of bidders participating in the auction be n.3 For each bidder i
with a valuation v his equilibrium bid is the expected bid of his runner-up conditional on i
being the winner,
b∗(v) = 1−
∫ v
0
xdF n−1(x)∫ v
0
dF n−1(x)
= 1− vn− 1
n
.
3Since bidders are risk-neutral and valuations are i.i.d. the uncertainty regarding the exact number of bidders
does not play a role as shown by Matthews (1987),McAfee and McMillan (1987).
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Since the bid is monotonic in the valuation, in order to win the bidder needs to have the
highest valuation. The probability of winning is thus F n−1 = vn−1, and the expected profit
is
Epi(v, b∗(v)) =
vn
n
.
Now we add the time dimension to the problem. Each bidder chooses the submission time
t ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that delaying submission is costly, submitting at time t costs the bidder
c(t), where c is increasing and convex, c′ > 0, c′′ > 0, and extremely high close to deadline,
c(1) = ∞. These costs represent the stress and attention costs of not missing the deadline
and also the costs of more precise bid delivery. In the world without bid leakage the timing
of the bid is irrelevant for winning and each bidder submits at time t = 0.
Now let bid leakage be possible. We assume that each bidder has the same prior belief
regarding the possibility of bid leakage. Conditional on that the auction is corrupted, the
probability that a specific bid is leaked and undercut decreases in time of submission: if you
submit later, then the chances of leakage of your bid are lower. We assume that for each
bidder the perceived probability that his bid submitted at time t is leaked and undercut is
exogenously given by some function β(t) decreasing in time, β′(t) < 0, down to zero at the
time of deadline t = 1, β(1) = 0.
Thus the expected profit of the bidder with valuation v and bid b∗(v) is as follows:
Epi(v, b∗(v), t) =
vn
n
(1− β(t))− c(t).
The optimal submission time t∗(v) is given by the first order condition:
c′(t∗(v)) = −v
n
n
β′(t∗(v)).
Observe that both b∗(v) is decreasing and t∗(v) is increasing in valuation v. Thus the
optimal bid and the submission time of the bid are confounded by the valuation. The higher
the valuation is, the more is the bidder ready to pay to get the contract: both in terms of
submitting a lower bid and in terms of costly delay of the submission.
Observe also that the correlation between the timing and the bid holds for each valuation,
and thus will be true not only for the winners but also for the runner-ups. We uncover this
correlation for runner-ups using a placebo dataset in Section 4.2 and use it to correct our
biased estimates for the winners.
2.4. Positive-Unlabeled Classification. Our bid leakage estimation strategy is based on
Positive-Unlabeled (PU) Classification. Generally, PU Classification is applied instead of
Supervised Classification in the cases when the training data set is not fully labeled. Specifi-
cally, only a subsample of the Positive data needs to be labeled as such, while the remaining
part of the Positive data and all the Negative data are mixed in the Unlabeled sample. This
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Table 1. Data set characteristics
Characteristics Mean Median Std. Dev.
Number of participants 3 2 1.9
Reserve price, rubles 182000 134000 150000
Winner’s bid, rubles 142000 97000 128000
Runner-up’s bid, rubles 154000 108000 134000
Price fall 0.23 0.18 0.21
Time from bid
to deadline, hours 40 20 54
Time from winner’s bid
to deadline, hours 39 19 54
Time from runner-up’s bid
to deadline, hours 39 20 53
Duration, hours 195 169 71
setting may be applied to our case if we regard runner-ups as fair (Positive) and the winners
as possibly corrupted (Unlabeled).
Numerous methods are proposed to solve PU Classification Elkan and Noto (2008); Kiryo
et al. (2017); Ivanov (2019). They are applied to various real-world problems, which include
detection of fake texts Ren et al. (2014), time-series classification Nguyen et al. (2011),
bioinformatics Yang et al. (2012), etc.
3. Auction Data
We extracted data4 on 1444718 requests for quotations that took place between January
2014 and March 2018. The data was preprocessed in the following way:
• The auctions with missing data or with obvious coding mistakes were dropped. These
obvious mistakes include: reserve price being negative or higher than the upper bound
500000 rubles; the starting date being after the ending date; the starting date, the
ending date or the bidding date being in the future; the bid being negative or higher
than the reserve price. 86% of the initial size is left.
• Our identification methods cannot be applied to auctions with 1 participant, so these
auctions are dropped. 44% of initial size is left.
The data on 636866 auctions remains after the preprocessing. The main characteristics of
this data set are shown in Table 1.
Notes: The data set excludes auctions with 1 participant and auctions with missing data. We define Price
fall as r−b1r , where r is reserve price, b1 is winner’s bid.
4The procurement auctions’ data are stored at ftp://zakupki.gov.ru
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4. Bid Leakage Estimation
Here we describe our two-stage bid leakage estimation strategy. Mainly, we reduce the
problem to Positive-Unlabeled Classification by considering the runner-ups as fair (Posi-
tive) participants and the winners as a mixture of fair (Positive) and corrupted (Negative)
participants.
We follow the state of the art DEDPUL procedure proposed in Ivanov (2019) for general
purposes. At the first stage of the procedure a supervised binary classifier is trained to
distinguish the winners from the runner-ups. Using cross-validation technique, predictions
of this classifier are obtained for all the winners in the data set. At the second stage these
predictions are transformed into bid leakage probabilities by estimating the ratio between
the densities of the predictions for the runner-ups and for the winners.
There is a crucial distinction of our strategy compared to the original DEDPUL procedure.
The original procedure would assume that bid leakage is the only reason why the winners
and the runner-ups differ for the classifier. However, as we have already discussed in Sections
2.2 and 2.3, this might not be the case, and the difference may exist even in the fair auctions.
To account for this we introduce into the analysis the synthetic placebo auctions defined in
Section 2.2, which are assumed to be fair, and modify the procedure correspondingly. These
modifications are discussed in details in Section 4.2.
4.1. First Stage: Winner vs Runner-up Classifier. In the first stage we train the
classifier to distinguish the bids of the winners from the bids of the runner-ups.
The features are presented in Table 2. These features are specifically designed to reflect
possible bid leakage patterns, while uncovering only little information about fair auctions.
Specifically, the features bid last? and bid timing reflect intention of a corrupted participant
to gather information about all the other bids. Small values of relative bid reflect under-
cutting. The feature met before? reflects the possibility of repeated procurer-participant
cooperation. Small values of relative bid timing might reflect fairness of participant, as bids
are unlikely to be leaked instantly.
Notes: relative bid is truncated at 0.1: values bigger than 0.1 are set to this threshold. Likewise, bid timing
and relative bid timing are truncated at 1440 minutes (1 day). Auctions with 1 participant are excluded
from the analysis.
Observe that the information on whether some two participants are from the same auction
is lost on purpose. The classifier does not choose the winner between the two participants
in each auction. Instead, it determines the chances that each set of features in the data set
belongs to a winner as opposed to a runner-up.
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Table 2. Features description
Name Type Range Description
bid last? Binary {0,1} Did participant bidafter other participants?
met before? Binary {0,1} Was participant in auctionwith this procurer before?
bid timing Continuous [0, 1440] Minutes from the momentbid is made to deadline
relative bid Continuous [0, 0.1] Difference with bid of succeeding place,normalized by reserve price
relative
bid timing Continuous [0, 1440]
Difference in minutes with bid timing
of previous minimal bid
number of
participants Integer [2, 86] Number of participants in auction
As a classifier we use gradient boosting of decision trees – namely, xgboost.5 We train
an ensemble of 60 trees on the features described above with depth of each tree limited to
5 levels. With this classifier we obtain predicted probability of winning for each winner in
the data set using cross-validation. At the second stage we establish the connection between
these predictions and the probability of bid leakage.
4.2. Second Stage: Transforming Classifier’s Predictions into Bid Leakage Prob-
ability. We show how to use the discussed classifier to estimate both the prior and the
posterior probabilities of bid leakage, neither of which are assumed to be known in advance
for any of the auctions. First we introduce notations and formally define the problem.
At the first stage the classifier estimates the probability that the participant wins based
on corresponding vector of features x. Denote this probability of winning as y(x). Denote
distributions of y(x) for winners and runner-ups as fw(y) and fw(y) respectively.
As was previously discussed, we consider the runner-ups to be fair participants (as we aim
to detect only successful bid leakage), while the winners may contain both fair and corrupted
participants. Moreover, the distributions of y(x) for the winners and the runner-ups of the
fair auctions might also differ. This may generally be expressed in the following mixture
model:
(1) fw(y) = fcorr2(y)
(2) fw(y) = αfcorr(y) + (1− α)(fcorr2(y) + ∆12)
5https://github.com/dmlc/xgboost
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(3) ∆12 = fcorr1(y)− fcorr2(y)
where α denotes the prior probability of bid leakage; fcorr(y), fcorr1(y), and fcorr2(y) denote
the distributions of y(x) for the corrupted winners, the fair winners, and the fair runner-ups
respectively; ∆12 denotes the difference between the distributions of the winners and the
runner-ups in fair auctions. Introduction of ∆12 into (2) is exactly what distinguishes our
case from the standard PU Classification problem setup. However, we will address the issue
of estimating ∆12 later. For now, consider it exogenous.
Our goal is to estimate the prior probability that a random winner is corrupted α and
the posterior probability that a specific winner is corrupted f(corr | y). The latter may be
expressed using the Bayes rule:
(4) f(corr | y) = αfcorr(y)
fw(y)
= 1− (1− α)(fw(y) + ∆12)
fw(y)
Following DEDPUL (Ivanov, 2019), the densities fw(y) and fw(y) may be estimated by
applying Kernel Density Estimation to the classifier’s predictions for the winners and the
runner-ups respectively. Then, both priors α and posteriors f(corr | y) may simultaneously
be estimated by applying Expectation-Maximization algorithm to (4), thus reaching our
goal.
Now we address the issue of ∆12 estimation. The key step is to construct the synthetic
data set of implicitly fair placebo auctions. As was previously discussed, placebo auctions are
generated from the real auctions by dropping the winners and keeping the other participants
which we know to be fair. In each hypothetical auction, the second-ranked bidder is assumed
to be the winner, and the third-ranked bidder is assumed to be the runner-up.
By applying the classifier that is trained on the real auctions to the placebo data set, we
may obtain its predictions to later estimate the densities fwp(x) and fwp(x) for the winners
and the runner-ups of placebo auctions respectively, where:
(5) ∆23 = fwp(y)− fwp(y)
Thus, we may estimate ∆23 by using placebo auctions. This becomes crucial as we make
a major assumption regarding equality of ∆12 and ∆23:
PARITY: ∆12 = ∆23. The difference between the winners and the runner-ups in the real
fair auctions is equal to this difference in the placebo auctions.
BID LEAKAGE IN PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS 11
Using the parity assumption we may estimate ∆12 and thus the priors α and the posteriors
f(corr | y) of bid leakage. In the next subsection we verify applicability of the parity
assumption.
4.3. Verifying parity and independence assumptions. First observe that independence
implies parity. Namely, if timing is independent from bidding, then both differences ∆12 and
∆23 (when estimated using only time-related features) are equal to zero ∆12 = 0 = ∆23
implying parity.
To test the independence assumption Korovkin et al. (2018) exclude all winning last bids
and then test if being last predicts a lower bid. They find the opposite effect (in this
subsample earlier bids are lower) of a much lower size. We replicate this observation with
our dataset.
However, if we exclude all winning bids (and not only those bids that were submitted last
as in Korovkin et al. (2018)), we find that later bids are more likely to be smaller. That is,
in the imaginary auction with only 2nd and 3rd lowest bids, the lower 2nd bid is on average
submitted later. This is also true when we exclude winners and 2nd lowest bids, and compare
3rd and 4th latest bids, the lower 3rd bid is on average submitted later.
Both independence and parity assumptions may be tested by training the classifier on the
real auctions and applying it to the placebo auctions. In the case if independence holds, we
expect the classifier’s performance on the placebo data set to be on a level of fair coin (0.5
accuracy and ROC-AUC), which is clearly not the case (Column 2 in Table 3). In the case
if parity holds, we expect the classifier to show the same performance on the placebo data
sets regardless of how many participants are dropped. Observe that this is the case for two
placebo data sets: when only the winners are dropped (Column 2 in Table 3) and when both
winners and runner-ups are dropped (Column 3 in Table 3). At the same time, classifier’s
performance on the real data set (Column 1 in Table 3) is considerably higher than on the
placebo data sets, which is expected in the presence of bid leakage.
Thus the evidence suggests that the parity assumption holds, meaning that our bid leakage
estimation strategy is applicable, while the stronger assumption of independence does not.
Both results hold when the bid-related features are excluded.
5. Empirical results
The overall prior probability of bid leakage in our sample is estimated as 16%, which is
slightly higher than 10-11% found previously in Korovkin et al. (2018). One of the reasons
for this discrepancy is that our sample also includes auctions with only two participants,
and bid leakage is significantly more likely there. The other reasons are due differences in
identification and estimation.
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Table 3. Measures of classifier’s performance on different data sets: on real
auctions (first column), on placebo auctions with dropped winners (second
column), on placebo auctions with dropped winners and runner-ups (third
column)
∆12, fcorr ∆23 ∆34
Accuracy 0.5819 +- 0.0005 0.5375 +- 0.0008 0.5387 +- 0.0012
ROC-AUC 0.6245 +- 0.0004 0.5581 +- 0.0008 0.5534 +- 0.0011
Notes: mean and standard deviation statistics of scores are calculated on outputs of 3-fold cross-validation,
repeated several times. Since classifier’s purpose is to learn the patterns that reflect bid leakage, its
suitability for our estimation strategy should be evaluated with the difference of the scores on the real (first
column) and the placebo (second and third columns) data sets, rather than solely the score on the real
data set.
The probability α for specific subsamples provides insights into the mechanisms behind
bid leakage. We present these results in Fig.3.
Figure 3. Bid leakage probability aggregated by auction characteristics
The top left diagram in Fig.3 demonstrates that as the reserve price increases, the bid
leakage is more likely to be observed. This is very natural and might have two explanations.
First, a higher reserve price for a contract gives higher incentives to organize risky corruption
schemes. Second, the better organized corruption schemes allow setting a higher reserve price
in order to maximize the surplus.
The top center diagram in Fig.3 demonstrates that the lower number of bidders on average
corresponds to higher probability of bid leakage. The number of participants in an auction is
endogenous: the entry is always costly and the expected benefit depends on the reserve price,
description of the contract and other details posted in the announcement. If some of these
details (such as required certification) deter entry or signal the experienced participants that
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bid leakage is likely, which results in fewer bidders entering the auction. If there is no such
deterrence, then the auction is desirable and entry is high. And a desirable auction is more
likely to be the one where bid leakage occurs.
As the number of bidders grows above four, the relation to bid leakage becomes ambiguous.
On the one hand, higher participation might mean that the auction was more competitive,
which corresponds to low α. On the other hand, as demonstrated earlier bid leakage is
correlated with reserve price, and an overly high reserve price might attract more bidders.
The top right diagram in Fig.3 demonstrates that there is no particular pattern in sea-
sonality of bid leakage. The only exception is December, where the procurement agencies
might be distributing their accumulated reserves.
The bottom left diagram in Fig.3 shows a stark relation of bid leakage and the difference
between the final price and the reserve price. When surplus is high, price fall can be a measure
of bidders’ competition. In general, the larger is the price fall, the lower is the probability
of bid leakage. However, if the price fall is below 5% then the predicted probability of bid
leakage increases with the price fall. This can be due to that the reserve price has been
already set very close to bidders’ valuations, providing little opportunity for bid leakage.
The bottom center diagram in Fig.3 demonstrates that commission size has very low influ-
ence on the probability of bid leakage. There is however a marginally significant difference
between commissions with 3 members and commission with 7 members, which naturally
suggests that larger commissions correspond to lower bid leakage.
The bottom right diagram in Fig.3 shows that the (estimated) favored participants submit
their bids at constant rates throughout the last 24 hours of the auction, except for the last
hour, when the submission rate is 2-3 times higher.
Finally, Fig.4 presents the cross-regional average probabilities of bid leakage. Perhaps
surprisingly, the variance between different regions is rather large, up to 90%. However,
these results are consistent with other measures of corruption available for Russian regions,
such as electoral fraud (see, e.g., Mebane and Kalinin (2009),Bader and van Ham (2015)).
6. Conclusions
We study first-price sealed-bid auctions and identify auctions corrupted with bid leakage.
The first stage of our strategy is to build a classifier that very well distinguishes the winners
from the runner-ups in the corrupted auctions but not as well in the fair auctions. In the
second stage we process the classifier’s predicted probabilities of winning for the winner and
the runner-up of each auction into the probability that the auction is corrupted. We apply
our estimation strategy to the Russian procurement data between January 2014 and March
2018 containing 636866 auctions.
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Figure 4. Estimated prevalence of bid leakage in regions of Russia
We estimate the share of the corrupted auctions in the dataset as 16%. We believe that
this estimate is conservative due to the assumptions we make. First, we are only concerned
with effective bid leakage, that is if the bids are leaked to the favored participant, she
inevitably wins. Consequently, when the classifier selects a runner-up, we assume it to be
a mistake. Second, we assume that the classifier selects all the winners of the corrupted
auctions. Consequently, when the classifier doesn’t select the winner of an auction, we
assume this auction to be fair.
Several problems remain open. First, our current strategy can only be applied to the
auctions with 2 and more participants. Second, and arguably the most important problem is
that the validation of our strategy in its classical way of comparison with labeled data is not
available. Yet the confidence in our strategy is reinforced by the economic interpretability
of the results: the bid leakage is more likely in auctions with a higher reserve price, lower
number of bidders and lower price fall, and where the winning bid is received in the last hour
before the deadline.
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